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BRIEF OF RESPONDENlSTATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellants, Anastacio Gallegos and Juan Rellis Gallegos, appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying their release upon Petition
for \V rit of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER COURT
On April 20, 1965, Anastacio and Juan Rellis
Gallegos filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
I

in the District Court for Salt Lake County attacking
their conviction for the crime of Second Degree Murder. An answer to the petition was filed by the State on
the 12th day of May, 1965, and on June 4, 1965, the
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
Joseph Jeppson, Judge, who dismissed the petition,
finding it without merit.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the decision of the trial
court denying relief by habeas corpus should be affirmed.
STATE:MENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts. The appellants filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that the prosecution knowingly used
perjured testimony and that the jury failed to follow
the court's instructions that no inference of guilt should
be drawn from the mere fact that appellants failed
to testify in their own behalf (R. 2). An answer to
the petition was filed denying the allegations ( R. 9) .
At the time of hearing, two witnesses were called on
behalf of the appellants, both of them testifying on
the issue of whether the jury followed the court's instructions relating to the failure of the appellants to
testify in their own behalf (R. 24 through 27, 29
through 31). Both jurors testified that they did follow
2

the court's instructions and drew no inference of the
appellants' guilt from the fact that they failed to testify
but, as a result of the appellants' failure to testify,
the evidence against them was unrebutted, which caused.
them to return a verdict of guilty.
The appellants before this court have rajsed IH,
issue relating to the question presented in the tr;al
court as to whether the jury properly follmved th2
court's instructions relating to the failure of the a11F:lants to testify in their own behalf.
The only issue remaining on appeal is the question
of whether the prosecution knowingly used perjureJ
testimony. (See Appellant's Brief.) The transcript
of trial was received in the trial court as was the transcript of the preliminary hearing had at the time of
appellants' original trial (R. 33). The nature of the
daim of alleged knowing use of perjured evidence by
the prosecution does not clearly appear of record. Appellants' counsel below alleged that there were inconsistencies between the testimony of the principal State's
witnesses at the time of preliminary hearing and at the
time of trial ( R. 34) . No evidence was offered to show
that the testimony given by the principal State's witness, _Mike Hoopiiana, was in fact false or false in any
material aspect. Appellants' counsel below made a
proffer as to the prosecution's knowledge, claiming that
the district attorney would have been familiar with the
preliminary hearing transcript and, consequently, would
have been aware of any deviation in the testimony of
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the State's witnesses from what appeared at the time
of the preliminary hearing. Based upon that record, the
trial court found no knowing use of perjured testimony
and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD IS VOID OF ANY EVIDENCE SHOWING A KNOWING USE OF
PERJURED TESTIMONY.
The trial court had before it the transcript of the
preliminary hearing and the h'anscript of the original
trial of the appellants. These records are not part of
the record on appeal in the instant case. Consequently,
the trial court was better able to determine whether the
claimed inconsistent statements actually warranted
relief by habeas corpus. The facts that appear in the
instant record are only that there was a variance in the
testimony of one witness from the time of the preliminary hearing and the time of trial. This court has previously reviewed the record in this case and found the
evidence sufficient as against the alleged claims for
reversal on appeal. State v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 102,
896 P.2d 414 (1964).
Nowhere in the record does it appear that the evidence actually given at the time of trial was in fact
false. In 70 C.J.S., Perjury, Section 46, it is stated:
4

. "It has been held or stated that where perjury
is based on contradictory oaths it is essential to
show which is true and which is false."
In State v. Lowe, 60 Ida. 98, 88 P.2d 502 (1939), the
Idaho Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ailshie concurring, noted:
"It has been stated by very high authority
that: 'If the pleader sets out contradictory oaths,
it is also essential to show which is true and which
is false.' Hilliard v. United States, 5 Cir., 24
F .2d 99, 100; 3 Bishop, New Cr. Proc., sec.
918."

Generally, proof of falsity of an item testified to is
essential to show that a statement given was perjured.
State v. Anderson, 35 Utah 496, IOI Pac. 385 (1909).
Nor does every statement which is inconsistent or partially false constitute perjury. In Marra v. People,
135 Colo. 458, 312 P.2d 505 ( 1957), the court note<l
that the elements of perjury to be proven are falsity
of the statement, its materiality to the issue, and the
admission of the oath. The record in the instant case
is materially deficient in showing that there was any
perjury. The record does not disclose wherein the alleged testimony was false nor show that it was material
rather than an insubstantial variance in the testimony.
This court observed in State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah
16, 16 P.2d 713 (1932), that evidence merely inconsistent with previous evidence would not justify a new
trial. See also Jeter v. Common'tvealth, 268 Ky. 285,
104 S.W.2d 979; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1460.
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In JVard v. 'J"urner, 12 U.2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 ( HHil),
this court reYersed release on habeas corpus on '.lk
basis of knowing use of perjured testimony in a ca-;r_:
substantially stronger than the instant case. This court
observed:

"***

In order to justify a release of a convicted person under a writ of habeas corpus or
coram nobis, or other special writ, the evidence
of his innocence must be stronger than would be
necessary in the first instance in support of a
motion for a new trial, for such special writs are
applied for after the defendant's conviction has
been affirmed or denied on appeal, and in a sense
they invade the usual rules for the finality of
judgments.''
Additionally, it should be noted that there is no~
one scrap of evidenice in the record to show that UK
prosecuting attorney had knowledge of the falsity ,:~
fact of any part of the alleged inconsistent testimony.
This is an essential to the appellants' case. Furthc:,.
since the instant case was a homicide case and a 'cranscript of the testimony given at preliminary hem<;~'";
was available to the defendants (Section 77-15-14, Uta;1
Code Annotated, 1953), the appellants, through tbc:ir
counsel, had full opportunity to point out to the j m;
any alleged inconsistency. At the time of trial, the
appellants' counsel did in fact point out a variaD<:e
between an unsworn statement given by the princ:;)al
witness to the police and a subsequent testimony at :he
time of trial. (See Case No. 10109, Brief of Respondent, pages 4 through 6.) Certainly, under these circum-
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stances, there is no basis for extraordinary relief at
this time.
In order to justify release on habeas corpus, it
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that
there was the knowing, wilful, and intentional use of
perjured testimony for the purposes of securing a conviction. Butt v. Graham, 6 U.2d 133, 307 P.2d 892
( 1957) ; Story v. Burford, 78 F.2d 911 (10th Cir.
1949) ; Ex Parte Mooney, 10 Cal.2d I, 73 P.2d 195.5
(1936); Mooney v. Halohan ,294 U.S. 103 (1935);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 ( 1957) ; 60 Columbia Law Review
858; 5 Utah Law Review 92. This has not been shown.
The appellants' contention that somehow the proceedings below did not afford them a fair forum in
which to present their petition is equally without merit.
Appellants' counsel called witnesses who testified to
appellants' theory of the case. The fact that the court
did not allow a continuance to obtain the testimony of
the district attorney is meritless since the court considered the appellants' proffer of proof as being a fact
and found it wanting. Further, the question of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Mathis, 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957).
Under the circumstances of this case, it is apparent
that it cannot be said that there is any merit for the
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. Ward v. Tiirner,
supra.
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CONCLUSION
The appellants were given a full and fair trial
at the time of the original charges in the instant case,
afforded appellate review and an opportunity to present
in an extraordinary proceeding evidence which would
justify a determination of their innocence, the granting of a new trial, or relief by habeas corpus. In each
instance, they have failed. In the instant appeal, it
is patently obvious that the appellants' claim is wholly
unmeritorious.
Rsepectfully submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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